Publications
"A Game Theory Perspective on Delivery Methods in Construction" with John Killingsworth. 2023, Lean Construction Journal, pp. 21-40.
Abstract: Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) in construction has long been celebrated for its ingenuity and efficiency, yet few principals (project owners and, or developers) choose it as a procurement method. We take a game theoretic approach to explain why this might be the case and expose the market failures that principals might be ignoring by choosing traditional methods over IPD. Our primary insight is that traditional design-bid-build projects encounter pervasive moral hazard problems that reduce the efficiency of construction and create conflict between participants. Informed by interviews with IPD participants, we model the important strategic and social advantages of IPD that complement more well-known efficiency advantages.
"The Decline of U.S. Labor Unions: Import Competition and NLRB Elections." 2023, Labor Studies Journal, Vol. 48 (1), 4-34.
Abstract: Why has private sector union participation fallen away so much in the United States since the late 1950s? Featuring an improved dataset on National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) representation elections, I present evidence that import penetration accounts for 42-55% of the decline in union formation for U.S. manufacturing. This estimate translates to 5-6% of the decline in private sector union density. The effect is driven by trade with low-income countries and, to some extent, other high-income countries. China is not a factor early on, but their strong import growth since 2000 can account for about 11 percentage points of the total decline.
"Decomposing the Decline of Unions: Revisiting Sectoral and Regional Shifts." 2023, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 76 (2), 387-411.
Abstract: This study uses newly disaggregated National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election data to revisit the theory that sectoral and regional shifts in economic activity contributed substantially to private-sector union decline in the United States. Unlike most studies, which focus on differential employment growth among union and non-union establishments, this article focuses on how such shifts may have affected organizational rates themselves. Improved data permit a shift-share decomposition that indicates that approximately 40% of the decline in union elections is in response to sectoral shifts, the majority attributable to changes within each sector. Moreover, in an update to Dickens and Leonard’s 1985 study, the author shows that declining organization rates since 1980 are responsible for a decline in union density of 5.4 percentage points.
"Bargaining and Conflict with Up-front Investments: How Power Asymmetries Matter," with Stergios Skaperdas, 2020, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 176, 212-225.
Abstract: We examine settings---such as litigation, labor relations, or arming and war---in which players first make non-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is efficient ex post, but we show that a player may prefer Conflict ex ante if there are sufficient asymmetries in strength. There are two sources of this finding. First, up-front investments are more dissimilar between players under Conflict, and they are lower than under Bargaining when one player is much stronger than the other. Second, the probability of the stronger player winning in Conflict is higher than the share received under Nash bargaining. We thus provide a rationale for conflict to occur under complete information that does not depend on long-term commitment problems. Greater balance in institutional support for different sides is more likely to maintain peace and settlements.
Supplementary Appendix. Mathematica Notebooks.
"Why Are There Strikes?" with Kyung nok Chun and Stergios Skaperdas, 2020, Revue D'Economie Politique, Vol. 130, No. 6.
Abstract: Strikes, just as other types of conflict, used to be difficult to explain from an economic perspective. Initially, it was thought that they were a result of mistakes or irrationality. Then, during the 1980s an explosion of research brought asymmetric information to prominence as a significant cause of strikes. After reviewing such long-standing potential explanations, we go over some more recent ones. When a strike changes the future strategic positions of unions relative to firms compared to a bargain, then a strike can ensue; significantly, the more important the future is considered to be (i.e., the higher is the discount factor), the more likely a strike is. In a new model we show how solidarity based on identification with the union can lead to strikes. Additionally, power asymmetries, reputation-building, and internal union politics can account for strikes within a rational-choice, economic perspective.
Non Peer-Reviewed Completed Work
"Gun Control: Regulation, the US Case" entry in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, edited by A. Marciano and G.B. Ramello, December 2024.
"Hidden Costs and Unheralded Virtues: Design-Bid-Build versus IPD" with John Killingsworth, March 2024, Lean Construction Institute.
"The Surprising Disappearance of Labor Unions in Rural America" with Cindy Vo and Ellery Osborne, 2023, June Report for REDI at CSU.
"The State of Colorado Labor Unions: Patterns Across Time and Space" with Sarah Thomaz, 2022, February Report for REDI at CSU.
Working Papers
"Navigating Slippery Slopes: A Paradox of Power in Policy and Cultural Reform" Under Review
Abstract: This study employs game theory to investigate how slippery slope problems drive policy impasses and sticky cultural practices. It identifies conditions under which hard-lining behavior, often perceived as fallacious, becomes rational. By endogenizing the probability of one policy leading to another, the model elucidates slippery slope equilibria, where players adamantly oppose all proposals, including those they want, in order to avoid those they hate. Aggressive negotiation tactics are ineffective against such equilibria, further exacerbating the political market failure. Notably, weaker reformers are able to avoid the slippery slope market failure and accomplish Pareto improving reform, whereas strong reformers can get stuck in a paradox of power.
"How Economic History can Explain the Gun Control Stalemate: Lessons from Labor Law" Under Review
Abstract: Recent tragedies in Buffalo, NY and Uvalde, TX have renewed and intensified the demand for greater firearms regulation in the United States. Yet meaningful reform has been mired in political impasse for decades. I use a simple game-theoretic model to show that the impasse is not the product of a polarized Congress or a particularly vocal minority, but actually the result of a three-sided commitment problem rooted in a uniquely American context. Remarkably, labor law concerning unions in the early 20th century overcame very similar obstacles and now poses a masterful rhyme to modern day gun law. Lessons from economic history thus indicate a strategic path forward.
"The Relationship between Working Capital Management and Corporate Profitability for US Construction Companies" with Hashem Esfahani, John Killingsworth, and Chris Harper. Revised and Resubmitted
Abstract: This research paper examines the relationship between working capital management and corporate profitability for US construction companies. The study aims to investigate whether effective working capital management practices positively influence corporate profitability in the construction industry. The research utilizes a sample of over 6000 US construction companies and measures their working capital management practices and profitability using financial ratios. The findings suggest that there is a consistent statistically significant correlation between Days in Accounts Receivable and Days in Accounts Payable with Net Profit Margin of companies in the US construction industry regardless of the company revenue. The results indicate that US construction companies that adopt effective working capital management practices are more likely to achieve higher levels of profitability. The study contributes to the literature on working capital management and corporate profitability by providing insights into the relationship between these two variables in the context of the US construction industry. The implications of the findings are discussed, and recommendations are provided for construction companies to improve their working capital management practices to enhance their profitability.
"Wood Waste Reduction Through Volumetric Modular Building Techniques" with Katie Bond, John Killingsworth, Jon Elliott, and Steven Conrad. Revised and Resubmitted
Abstract: In 2018, the United States’ construction and demolition sector produced 41 million tons of wood waste, 73% of which went to landfills. Transitioning to a circular economy is one way to reduce organic construction waste in landfills and, therefore, reduce methane emissions. Modular construction techniques present one approach to advance circular economy in construction. This study examines whether volumetric modular construction produces less wood framing waste than traditional site-built construction. Using a comparative case study method, researchers found that the controlled factory environment of volumetric modular construction allowed for substantially increased wood waste aversion and diversion over traditional site-built construction. Our findings suggest wood waste savings of 32% and an 88-91% reduction in waste that went to the landfill. Even allowing for differences in measurement accuracy and the inferential limitations of case studies, our results provide new evidence regarding the relative efficiency and environmental impact of volumetric modular construction. Further, this study highlights that modular construction techniques intrinsically support the aims of a circular economy through elimination of waste through superior design and systems. While this study focused on wood materials within a given industry sector and region, opportunities for further research to expand this study through the investigation of other materials within the off-site construction industry exist.
"Automation and the Decline of Union Formation"
Abstract: This paper evaluates how automating technologies may have contributed to union decline. After discussing the history of post WWII automation and its interaction with routineness in labor markets, I outline three hypotheses for how automation affected union formation in the United States. I then present the available measures of automation such as Routine Task Intensity to set up an empirical analysis using newly improved data on National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) representation elections. Results from fixed effects panel regressions suggest that automation did not have a significant effect on formation rates between 1975 and 2010. It is possible, however, that these regressions capture competing forces that cancel each other out and mask more nuanced effects.
Marinating Projects
"Where Unions Fell: The Geography and Demography of Union Formation in the U.S.''
Abstract: Despite a deepening literature on the how and why of union decline in the US, less is known about the who and where. This study introduces an expansive dataset on National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) representation elections that offers a novel perspective on the patterns and consequences of union decline. By leveraging newly available county disaggregation, I reveal a significant shift in the spatial distribution of elections, with rural areas experiencing a more pronounced decline compared to urban areas. A shift share decomposition shows that this result is not driven by urbanization or sectoral shifts. Instead, evidence suggests unions have strategically redirected efforts towards higher value targets in urban regions, leaving workers in rural areas isolated and more vulnerable to monopsony power. The study also explores demographic and economic factors associated with union organizing, shedding light on evolving trends since the 1970s.
"From Hospitals to Economic Growth: Analyzing the Hill-Burton Program’s Structural Effects" with Tim Komarek and Ray Miller
Abstract: This paper investigates the long-term effects of public subsidies from the Hill-Burton program on structural transformation across U.S. counties. The program allocated $100 billion (in 2017 dollars) in direct and matching funds for hospital infrastructure between 1947 and 1971. Using a difference-in-differences event-study approach, we assess the lasting impact of these subsidies. Our results show that counties receiving Hill-Burton funding saw substantial growth in employment and business establishments in the decades following the program’s implementation. We also explore the heterogeneous effects across different sectors and regions. This study highlights the lasting influence of public investment in healthcare infrastructure on local economic structure and development.